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This chapter explores how contextual interpretation of commercial contracts functions as a conduit through which various external considerations and values can be applied to better understand the parties’ agreement.  The use of contextual evidence potentially increases the scope for judicial control of contracts. In common with the chapter by Blake Morant, it assesses the importance of contract context in addressing elements of unfairness and inequality in commercial agreements. However, this chapter takes contract interpretation as the medium through which this control can be effected, rather than the procedural unconscionability approach advanced by Morant. 

The mainstream view is that courts are restrained by English law against any open engagement with considerations of fairness pursued directly through broad equitable principles or general requirements of good faith. Instead the law has favoured a more restricted form of control exerted through specific doctrines that tend to have a relatively narrow field of operation and that can, with a few exceptions, be ousted by express contract terms. Increasingly however, contract interpretation has become the most significant process used to identify the parties’ contractual obligations, even to the extent that some familiar legal doctrines are now explained and justified as specific manifestations of a more general and overarching theory of interpretation. This appears to be the understanding of Lord Hoffmann who expanded the reach of contextual contract interpretation so that interpretation, rather than doctrine, provides the starting point for considering such matters as whether it is necessary to imply a term into an agreement,​[1]​ or whether a loss is too remote to found a claim in damages.​[2]​ The process of  ‘interpreting the contract’, as opposed to applying some other more transparently interventionist legal doctrine (such as implied terms or equity-derived principles), is more attractive to courts as a way to resolve commercial contract problems since the doctrines make little pretence to preserve freedom of contract. The rationale being that the courts are not so much policing or regulating contracts, or imposing outcomes, but are simply ‘interpreting’ them by discovering what the parties have agreed (as reasonable people). Yet while the expansion of contract interpretation might be regarded as a natural feature of a legal system committed to freedom of contract, some aspects of the ascendancy of contextual interpretation are problematic.    
	First, perhaps counter-intuitively for an approach that appears to put the express contract terms firmly at its centre, the breadth and inherent open texture of ‘context’ creates a broader scope for judges in commercial law matters to adopt a more active judging style, and on occasion to reach conclusions that appear antithetical to the express terms. However, such discretion is an inherent  part of what it is to ‘interpret’ a contract rather than engage in some other activity in relation to it, such as applying a legal rule, or some other external standard or policy. All these processes may be regarded as part and parcel of interpretation, but this depends on how contract law has framed the relevant interpretation test and what the law regards as the thing to be interpreted. If an interpretation test is broad and allows reference to a wide range of extrinsic factors, beyond the express terms, then much can be achieved through interpretation, including policing the bargain. 
A narrower or more restrictive test reduces the scope for using interpretation in this more active fashion. English law has adopted a narrower test. While this seemingly precludes a judge from interfering with the bargain under the auspices of interpretation, it simply results in a degree of subterfuge in the process, leading to a lack of transparency. Second, contextual interpretation of contracts is replete with references to commercial standards. When the choice between different plausible interpretations of a contract comes down to an assessment of whether outcomes pass tests of ‘commercial reasonableness’ or ‘commercial absurdity’, it is an open question as to how far the chosen interpretation can be derived in any meaningful sense from the contract text. Considering whether an outcome upholds ideas of commercial common sense involves a direct engagement with various policy arguments that operate largely independently of the meaning of the terms. 
	Whether judicial policing of the agreement is best pursued and effected through contract interpretation, rather than the direct application of some other legal rule or principle, is worth examining since judges themselves are not in agreement on what can be achieved through contract interpretation. The debate here is not necessarily between judges remaining committed to literalism as a defensible interpretation method and those fully embracing contextualism – very often competing interpretations of the same contract are all claimed to be derived from a ‘contextual’ method – but resides in the nature of contextual interpretation itself, in particular its tendency to collapse the boundaries between different kinds of contract problems and the different techniques that might be used to resolve them. As a matter of impression, there are  occasions where a conclusion presented by a judge as derived from an interpretative enquiry into the meaning of the contract text (in context), could just as easily be presented as the result of imposing an external standard directly to the agreement. The latter could be done without any need to filter the conclusion through a process of interpretation, although a combination of the facts and express terms raise a textual difficulty which provides a route into considering and applying  external considerations.  
	This chapter seeks to draw out the policing role for contextual contract interpretation and assess its possible implications. It begins by examining the different ideas behind ‘contextualism’ in contract, and shows how English law has adopted a narrow version of contextualism. This can be contrasted with a broader understanding of it, evident in Professor Morant’s contribution. Commitment to the narrow version of contextualism makes it doubtful that English law can openly pursue an activist policing role through contract interpretation. The chapter then considers how the law nevertheless controls aspects of the bargain through contextual interpretation, and some of the features of contextual interpretation that make this possible. Finally, it assesses why English contract law may prefer to present outcomes in contract disputes as following from interpretations of the contract rather than the application of other contract law doctrines.  

Contextualism as an interpretation method and as a contract law movement  

The notion of  ‘contextualism’ in contract law can be understood in two quite distinct senses. The first is as a method of interpretation and the second is as a substantive movement in contract law. There is considerable overlap between these versions, but they are not completely co-extensive. In the UK ‘contextualism’ often has quite narrow connotations. It is associated with a method of contract interpretation brought to prominence by Lord Hoffmann.​[3]​ This method aims to interpret the contract text - the express terms – through an analysis of the background or context in which the agreement operates. This contextual meaning is important since it is the one available to the reasonable interpreter who can best understand the true meaning of the contract. In Lord Hoffmann’s view, there is no need for ambiguity or absurdity in the contract meaning in order to use the contextual interpretative method. Contextualism is the only process at work, whether the words appear ambiguous or relatively clear. Understood as an interpretation method, contextualism stands opposed to literalism, which takes the view both that words have plain meanings and that courts should apply that plain meaning even if it leads to absurd results. There is a philosophical and linguistic debate here concerning whether words can be said to have plain or literal meaning or whether true meaning is always contextually derived.​[4]​ This wider debate will not be examined here, although it is reflected throughout contract legal reasoning.    
	The idea that contract context is always relevant to contract interpretation has been controversial, although much of this debate is related to what counts as admissible contextual evidence. While most judges accept that words are to be interpreted in context, some have been less willing to surrender the idea that plain meanings are possible. For these judges it remains a first principle, in keeping with the values of English contract law, that such plain meanings, if accessible, should be applied, however counter-intuitive the result is on the facts. This approach requires the judge to ignore whether ‘context’ rather than ‘text’ suggests some different or more reasonable alternative meaning that could be attributed to the words.​[5]​ At one level this can be regarded as a dispute about the relative importance of accessing the ‘real’ or common intentions of the parties in interpretation, over the pursuit of a more robust objectivism, which focuses exclusively on the words of the text. 
Lord Hoffmann’s statement has been regarded as substituting a greater subjectivity in contract interpretation (since it highlights the importance of individual contractual context to contract meaning) at the expense of a rigid objectivism that relies almost wholly on applying a semantic interpretative approach.​[6]​ For a judge with more literalist sympathies, the move towards contextual interpretation is unwelcome since it provides scope for courts to substantively remake or improve the agreement by vague and dubious appeals to context. Such judges deny that contextual interpretation can or should allow judges to exercise a corrective role over the text, whether the ‘correction’ is necessary to do what the judge thinks the parties actually intended, what he thinks they would have done had they thought about it, or to do what the judge thinks ought to be done, irrespective of the intentions of the parties. Ultimately however, contextualists and literalists are at least generally agreed that what is being interpreted is a contractual document: ‘Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person.’​[7]​ Granted, contextualism takes the enquiry as to what the contract means outside the evidence presented by the text,​[8]​ but nevertheless, the thing to be interpreted is the language of the document. This fits with the understanding that interpretation is necessarily a parasitic activity.​[9]​ An interpretation is always of something and this marks a fundamental distinction between interpretation and creation.  
Although a contextual approach might consider a wider range of evidence in affixing meaning, as an interpretative method in English law, contextualism is not generally regarded as permitting express contract terms to be overridden by evidence of such matters as trade customs, expectations of the parties or other norms generated by contextual matters operating externally to the contract terms. This sort of evidence could only assist in the interpretative exercise to the extent it sheds light on what the express terms of an agreement mean. Contextualism in this sense may be regarded as just a more enlightened form of textualism, where the words of a text remain paramount but they take their meaning from the background, rather than being solely viewed as self-interpreting.   
	This narrow form of contextualism can be contrasted with a broader view. ‘Contextualism’ can describe a contract law movement that emphasises the importance to the contracting process of factors that appear beyond the scope of the contract documents.​[10]​ This understanding of contextualism qua movement is more advanced in the U.S. where in the scholarly literature it is often, although not always, assimilated with relationalism or socio-legal approaches to contract, as contrasted with neo-formalism. In this movement, ‘context’ refers to an amorphous category of extra-contractual factors that may or ought to impinge on the legal understanding of the contractual agreement and hence the resolution of disputes. This movement may examine context as a means for accessing and giving effect to the parties ‘real deal’ in attempting either to come to a fuller understanding of the parties’ relationship, or to recognize and redress power and information asymmetries between the parties that remain obscured behind the law’s objective approach.​[11]​ 
Contextualism in the above sense provides a framework for giving meaning to various standards-based concepts that are reckoned to have some explanatory power in contract law but which defy simple definition, such as the concepts of ‘good faith’, ‘reasonable expectations’​[12]​ and unconscionability. A contextual approach to resolving disputes recognizes that these broad concepts have a flexible content able to deal with the uniqueness of different contract types, each with its own unique background.​[13]​ However, a high-context legal reasoning strategy has been criticized on various grounds: (i) costs; (ii) lack of judicial expertise and legitimacy in pursuing a contextual approach; (iii) inefficiency; (iv) incoherence; (v) lack of justification. The latter ground sees contextualism as a thinly veiled attempt by judges to impose norms of fairness on the parties’ agreement.​[14]​  
	Both the broader and narrower versions of contextualism might be regarded as interpretative in the sense that they are trying to ascribe meaning to something – the contract - in a situation of doubt.​[15]​ But they reflect very different understandings of what contracts are and the nature of the interpretive enterprise. The narrower version concentrates on the contract text, the broader version on the entire business relationship and its operative context. Since in English law contextualism is largely understood as an interpretation method applied to the contract text, this appears to limit the capacity of contextual interpretation to remedy aspects of unconscionability, control unfairness or level the playing field between contractors of unequal bargaining power. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to state that contextual interpretation in English law never performs a contract-policing function. Given the fluidity of the concepts of both interpretation and context, the lines between what is an exercise of contextual interpretation and what is an exercise of something else, whether the application of contract law doctrine or an exercise of judicial discretion, are easily blurred. This is considered further below.  

Contextual interpretation and the policing of contracts

That contextual contract interpretation performs a policing role becomes clearer on consideration of interpretation cases where it is difficult to conclude that something has ‘gone wrong with the language’. Very often interpretation problems are not linguistic, or text based – the text may be quite clear - but factual and circumstantial. Similarly, it is not clear that mistakes in drafting, or situations where a choice is required to be made between what appear to be unnatural meanings, should be regarded as issues about interpretation of the text, since ultimately the answer provided may be difficult to derive from the text. This is one of the reasons why contract law has a doctrine of rectification. Yet there are cases where the courts have used contextual interpretation to undertake direct interference in what appears to be quite clear statements of obligation. In such cases, the role for context is not necessarily to resolve ambiguity, but to create it as a means for judges to impose something approaching a reasonable result. 
Even allowing for the fluidity of the concept of interpretation, it might be wondered whether contextual interpretation is the best method within the law for dealing with unreasonable results, or even for articulating and understanding the issues that are raised by these legal problems. An example is provided by Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) v Ali.​[16]​ This case illustrates the nebulous boundary between interpreting contractual obligations and policing them. An employee of a bank, Mr Naeem, was made redundant following a reorganisation of the bank’s business. In addition to the various redundancy payments to which he was entitled, he received an extra payment in return for signing a release form. The form stated that, ‘the Applicant agrees to accept the terms set out in the documents attached in full and final settlement of all or any claims ... of whatsoever nature that exists or may exist’. The bank later collapsed after the public exposure of widespread corruption by senior managers and employees. In an earlier decision, the House of Lords had recognized that, in principle, innocent ex-employees who faced difficulties in the labour market because of their association with a disgraced bank would have a claim for ‘stigma damages’.​[17]​ The issue in BCCI v Ali was whether Mr Naeem, and others, were precluded from pursuing such a claim by signing the release form, the stigma claim being undeveloped and unpredicted at the time of their redundancy. 
	Looking at the wording of the text of the release, it seems to present no great difficulty in meaning. Mr Naeem had ostensibly signed away his rights to make any claim ‘of whatsoever nature that exists or may exist’. While the contract context (employment and redundancy) might limit claims ‘of whatsoever nature’ to financial claims arising out of the employment relationship, and not unrelated actions (such as a personal injury claim against the bank, or a claim arising from his capacity as a depositor at the bank), it appeared from the wording of the contract text, that Mr Naeem was prevented from pursuing the novel claim for stigma damages. Whether Mr Naeem ought to be bound to the agreement based on the facts of the case raised a different set of considerations, which were arguably not ones related to the meaning of the text of the release. Certainly this was the view of the majority of the Court of Appeal, for whom the operative issue was not one of interpretation or construction of the term, which was straightforward, but whether the bank should be allowed to rely on the term given the circumstances of its later collapse. In light of the bank’s fraudulent dealings (bank officers were aware of the fraud at the time of the redundancy and Mr Naeem was not), the Court of Appeal decided that equity would intervene, rendering it unconscionable to allow the bank to rely on the release term.   
	By a 4 to 1 majority, the House of Lords also concluded that the release did not prevent Mr Naeem’s claim for stigma damages. However, the majority did not rely on the operation of equitable principles, but instead reached this decision by what they expressed to be an exercise of contextual interpretation of the release. Lord Clyde suggested that a ‘literal’ reading would imply that the release sought to exclude liability for all claims of whatever nature, whether employment related or not. Since that cannot have been the intention of the parties, the literal meaning was rejected. 
Lord Clyde suggested that the literal approach dictates an all or nothing conclusion – literalism requires reading the clause as widely as it can possibly be read. It is then of course much easier to denounce such an interpretation as giving rise to wholly unreasonable results concerning the extent of the release. This triggers the House of Lords’ ability to substitute its own reasonable view based on policy matters of a more general nature,​[18]​ such as, courts should be slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights of which he was unaware without clear language,​[19]​ the balance between the right given up and the payment given in return should be appropriate,​[20]​ and who, in the circumstances, bears the risk of a change in the law.​[21]​ Certainly these could be relevant factors to consider as part of a broader concept of contextual interpretation, but not a narrow textual inquiry. 
In his dissent, Lord Hoffmann also considered it unnecessary to rely on a broad equitable jurisdiction to displace the literal meaning, but the conclusion he drew from his application of the contextual interpretation method was quite different. While reiterating that all interpretation is contextual, Lord Hoffmann accepted that ‘the primary source for understanding what the parties meant is their language interpreted in accordance with conventional usage’.​[22]​ This allowed him to conclude that ‘BCCI is not contending for a literal meaning. It is contending for a contextual meaning, but submitting that while the context excludes claims outside the employee relationship, it includes unknown claims.’​[23]​ For Lord Hoffmann a consideration of the wider background leads to the conclusion that the parties intended the contract to ‘mean what it says’ in context.​[24]​ To hold otherwise would have involved the draftsman in excess verbiage in an attempt to achieve comprehensiveness in the clause.  Lord Hoffmann criticized the majority in the case for giving ‘too little weight to the actual language and background’ of the document, which would have made the intended meaning clear,​[25]​ and for confusing the question of what the term meant with the question of whether, in the light of their conduct, BCCI should be able to rely on the term. 
	 In BCCI v Ali we have what were ostensibly two exercises of contextual interpretation resulting in two quite different conclusions about meaning. Of course disagreement over interpretations is characteristic of the interpretative method, but it is also common in textual interpretation. Arguably, the Court of Appeal’s method of distinguishing the issue of meaning from the issue of whether that meaning should apply was a much more transparent way of dealing with the problem that arose on the facts. The role of policy considerations in the majority’s reasoning in the House of Lords invites some caution over treating this outcome as a case of interpretation of the contract text. The result might be defensible as ‘interpretative’ in the much broader sense of the contextual movement, including recognition of the circumstances when the text should not be allowed to determine an issue.​[26]​ This aside, however, it is clear that the majority’s approach demonstrates how the courts can, motivated by policy, adjust a bargain through the auspices of interpreting a contract.  Questions over the parameters of interpretation – when one is engaged in it and when one is doing something else – raise issues that cannot be adequately addressed in this short chapter. What can be done however is to draw out some of the features of the contextual interpretative method, as applied by English judges, that facilitate their control over the terms of the bargain. 
 
Features of contextual interpretation that facilitate contract policing

It is natural that a commercial contract law which places considerable emphasis on freedom of contract would seek to resolve as many contract problems as possible by close attention to the contract text rather than by the application of external doctrines which may yield unpredictable results. The problem is that English law regards interpretation as having a rather narrow textual focus, and this raises concerns over how much context is necessary to affix the parties’ intended meaning of terms and the point at which the examination of contextual matters detaches from the words of the text and slips over into matters of policy and value-judgment that largely operate independently of the terms. 
The nature of interpretation makes it challenging to identify when an interpretative process transforms into a different kind of undertaking. In many other fields where interpretation takes place, in literature and the arts for example, identifying the point at which this transition occurs may not much matter.  In contract law, however, where interpretation is a pragmatic exercise that is conducted against a backdrop of legal, political and institutional constraints on the judiciary, it becomes important. Despite the difficulties, some tentative suggestions can be made over the features of contextual interpretation that account for the fuzziness of the transition from interpreting the text to policing the agreement. For one thing, sources and understandings of ‘context’ vary widely and this allows for some flexibility in pursuing certain aims and values within contract interpretation – there are very few considerations carrying weight in the resolution of a contract dispute that could not be presented as part of the contract context in one way or another. Other features of the contextual interpretation method also lend themselves to a degree of creativity in dealing with contract disputes. These are considered in what follows.  

Contextual interpretation: A single stage or two-stage process?

Given English contract law’s focus on the documented agreement, it is easy to assume that contract interpretation is a discrete doctrine that resolves difficulties and disputes within the contract text. The Karen Oltmann​[27]​ case, for example, raises a typical contract interpretation problem involving textual ambiguity. While contract interpretation is associated with textual difficulties, this does not exhaust the problems raised by contracts where a broadly interpretative approach appears appropriate. Quite apart from the difficulty presented by contract gaps, many problems in contract law arise because factors external to the contract text suggest the outcome dictated by a textual analysis of the terms ought not to be permitted. The reason for doubt may relate to something in the specific context of the parties’ relationship, or it may be a more general consideration concerning the unlikelihood of a sensible commercial contractor agreeing to a particular deal. This is often where assessments of commercial reasonableness become important. Alternatively, if one holds to the view that one should not look beyond the text and immediate facts in interpretation, that words can have plain meanings, and that the political and institutional limitations on judges dictate that meaning should be applied unless compelling circumstances suggest otherwise, then the interpretative issue may seem unproblematic. That is, the words of the text themselves do not suggest any doubt relating to their meaning. This is not to say that an unwelcome result must be allowed to stand, just that it may be difficult to interpret the text to avoid an unpalatable result, even when interpretation is contextual (the specific context of the contract may provide no helpful evidence one way or the other). This latter position regards resolution of contract problems (where a contractual text exists) as involving a two-stage process. Stage one is working out the effect that the contract as written would have, stage two is determining whether that meaning ought to be applied. The advantage of such a two-stage approach is transparency: it separates the issue of what the contract means from that of whether that meaning ought to apply in the situation that has arisen. This was the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in BCCI v Ali.
	One of the effects of Lord Hoffmann’s stipulation in BCCI v Ali that all meaning is contextually derived has been the tendency to combine the issues of what the text communicates and whether the text should determine the outcome in a single enquiry: what is the contextual meaning of the contract? This fuses, and may render indistinguishable, the different problems that may arise from the facts, the contract context and the text itself. The facts and context, rather than the text, may therefore exert a considerable influence over an outcome that is presented as an interpretation of the text. This is unavoidable to a large extent, since it follows from the current understanding of what contract interpretation is and how it should be undertaken. Lord Hoffmann sought to assimilate legal interpretation with the process of interpreting any communicative utterance (meaning and understanding is always contextually-derived) and therefore there is no limit on the depth of background that the receiver brings to bear when accessing the meaning of an utterance. Lord Hoffmann appeared to accept one corollary of this, that if attention to the background suggested that something is wrong with the language, it is possible to correct the utterance to accord with the meaning derived from the context and background.​[28]​ 




‘Contextual interpretation’ is a very broad label that applies to different types of approaches that might be used to resolve contract disputes. Kostritsky distinguishes purposivism, contextualism, and consequentialism as methods of interpretation, contrasting them with formalism and textualism.​[29]​ It is not clear whether she intends these to be understood as distinct methods, but she explains that the first three approaches all involve ‘consulting either the overall purpose of the parties, the extrinsic circumstances or the consequences of adopting a particular interpretation’.​[30]​ In English law these are not clearly distinguished and certainly the reference to ‘background’ in Lord Hoffmann’s view of contextual interpretation can encompass all of these (‘absolutely anything’​[31]​). In part, this is because of the vague nature of context and its relationship to the disputed piece of contract text. That ‘context’ includes all matters that are not the text is about as close to a general definition as one can get.​[32]​  It is often noted that context operates on a continuum that moves from specific context, relevant to the isolated case, to more general considerations lying at the periphery of the contract with only oblique connections to the contract text.​[33]​ Thus there may be several different layers of context and an interpretation may change depending the chosen layer of context used to determine meaning.  In contract, these layers of context may range from the rest of the contract document, to the overall purposes of the contract, to the immediate facts surrounding contract formation and the dispute, to perceived standards of commercial reasonableness and acceptable behaviour amongst a specific body of contractors. Choice of the relevant context is therefore crucial to any determination of outcomes, but the contexts in which an agreement can be placed are not always self-evident or self-selecting. While English law might like to limit admissible context to the facts surrounding the contract formation, the dispute and rest of the document, it is difficult to rein in context in a principled manner. As a result, contextual interpretation is capable of operating in a fairly benign or an activist fashion.  
	That there exist marked differences over how widely one can draw the relevant context in order to access contract meaning is seen quite clearly in contract disputes. In Kudos Catering (UK) Ltd v Manchester Central Convention Complex Ltd​[34]​, for example, the interpretation issue concerned an exclusion of liability, which was framed in broad terms. In interpreting the clause, the Court of Appeal regarded one important element of context as the location of the disputed term in relation to the rest of the agreement. Its placement amongst other terms dealing with indemnities allowed the Court to conclude that the contentious clause only dealt with claims under the indemnity provisions, leaving other claims substantially intact. This very limited understanding of the relevant context was mirrored in BMA Special Opportunity Hub Fund v African Minerals Finance Ltd,​[35]​ where the Court of Appeal upheld the contract’s plain meaning over a more commercially sensible meaning.  Context can be drawn much wider, however, as can be seen from the House of Lords decision in The Achilleas.​[36]​  In this case reference to understandings of participants in the trade were an important element of context for Lord Hope and Lord Hoffmann. These trade conventions justified a particular interpretation of the parties’ obligation to pay damages for breach of contract. 
	Even when an outcome appears to be driven by a very narrow reading of the relevant context, more general considerations beyond the text may also play a role in affixing meaning. In BMA, the Court noted that the written contract was 146-pages long, had taken three months to negotiate and had involved multiple teams of lawyers, employed at considerable expense, on either side.​[37]​ All this suggested there was some precision in the terms that ought not be overridden by considerations of ‘commercial reasonableness’, however compelling the argument from reasonableness may have appeared on the facts. Indeed, commercial reasonableness was, in this context, interpreted as involving commitment to the terms as written.​[38]​ 
The restrictive assessment of the relevant context demonstrated in BMA can preclude a search for wider contextual factors that might undermine the operation of the terms.​[39]​  Similarly, a limited reading of context in Kudos appeared to follow from a finding that a commercial contractor would not be expected to surrender all his remedies for breach of contract without clear words stipulating that outcome. The interpretation advanced in Kudos is an amalgam of close reading of the contract text, ideas concerning what a reasonable contractor would and would not agree to, and that a contract is a meaningful exchange of some value which denies that all remedies for breach should be excluded. These general judgments may find a firmer footing in judicial experience than in the words of the contract text.
	The determination of whether a contract requires a more or less formal interpretive approach is one of the main ways contract policing can occur through contextual interpretation. Consider, for example, Rice v Great Yarmouth Borough Council.​[40]​ The case concerned the effect of a contractual obligation giving one party the right to terminate the agreement for ‘any breach’. The trial judge in Rice recognized that, ‘[t]here has long been a tension in the world of contract between an attachment to literal meaning that makes for certainty with all in black and white and the parties knowing exactly where they are and little room for the relative unpredictability of judicial intervention, and a desire to avoid consequences seen as unfair or seen as offending commercial commonsense.’​[41]​ Particularly relevant matters of context here were that the agreement was to last for four years and involved repetitive obligations; that it involved substantial investment on the part of the claimant; that the contract appeared to allow for the draconian remedy of termination in relation to all or any breaches although the obligations under the agreement were diffuse and diverse. These matters of context pointed to a need for a ‘business commonsense’ interpretation of the agreement, whereby only a repudiatory breach would give rise to the right to terminate. Here the interpretative issue appears not to be about the terms of the agreement – ‘any breach’ seems tolerably clear - but on the correct context in which the agreement should be placed--a strict legal one, or a broader context that demanded a greater degree of flexibility over the obligations?  The Court of Appeal elected to use a broader context in limiting the scope of the ‘any breach’ language. A decision that a stricter, more legal-formalistic, context is appropriate will lead to a different conclusion.​[42]​  
	While such interventionist approaches may be warranted, particularly when there is a disparity in economic power between contractors, pursuing such outcomes through interpretation has a tendency to obscure more than illuminate. Thus one important consideration in relation to these exercises of judicial power is that, at least in commercial contexts, they are often articulated as decisions or interpretations that follow from commercial considerations, rather than matters of contractual justice, good faith or fairness. For example, in Rice, Lady Justice Hale recognized that it was perfectly open to contracting parties to stipulate that every breach of a condition beyond the trivial could give rise to a right to terminate the agreement. However, she then quoted from Lord Diplock that ‘if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must yield to business commonsense’.​[43]​ The precise value judgments at work in fixing on the content of these commercial standards are rarely openly expressed, and thus cannot be subjected to meaningful scrutiny.  This is discussed further below.   	
	 
Commercial reasonableness and commercial common sense as interpretative criteria

Assessments of ‘business common sense’ can play an important role in contract interpretation, particularly when the adjudicator is faced with a choice between equally plausible meanings of an express term. While reference to these sorts of standards are relatively commonplace in commercial contract law, the substantive criteria lying behind such appeals have remained obscure. They appear rooted in judicial value judgments, gained from experience concerning the conduct of commercial dealings, acceptable behaviour of the part of commercial contractors and what are, and are not, permissible results of contractual wording.  Needless to say, these kinds of commercial standards are very malleable. This makes them apposite to perform a policing role in contract law since they can incorporate both specific and more general considerations. It is clear that commercial reasonableness, for example, does not express any definitive, consistent idea or uniform value, but varies across both judicial minds and commercial contexts. Judges frequently disagree about whether it is permissible for them to make assessments of commercial reasonableness, and indeed what outcomes pass this threshold or fall below it. 
A difference of judicial opinion on the role of judicial assessment of commercial reasonableness was demonstrated between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank.​[44]​ The issue in the case concerned a payment refund guarantee supplied by a shipbuilder’s bank (respondents in the case) and whether it was triggered by the shipbuilder’s insolvency. The contract referred to the repayment of sums in the event of ‘termination, cancellation or rescission of the contract or upon a total loss of the vessel’. The majority of the Court of Appeal in the case thought it impermissible for the court to look into the commercial sense behind the agreement, given their lack of awareness of the considerations that led to the bargain, and the difficulties of judging what was an absurd or unreasonable result.​[45]​ Lord Clarke in the Supreme Court argued that it was the omission of insolvency that could not be explained for any commercial reason. The insolvency of the shipbuilder was the most obvious eventuality for which the security of the bond to repay was required and this interpretation was judged to be consistent with the commercial purpose of the bonds.  Judgments concerning absurdity and commercial sense appear to be more the result of an imposition of the standards of the sensible commercial contractor onto the agreement. Patten LJ seemed to appreciate that judicial determinations of commercial reasonableness should not be made only on the evidence of ambiguous express terms. One can hardly criticize him for this refusal to engage with the commercial reasonableness argument, given that other judges have faced censure from appeal courts for using their ‘commercial experience’ in resolving disputes.​[46]​ Similarly, courts often warn commercial parties that whether deals make ‘commercial sense’ is a matter for them to determine, not their legal advisers.​[47]​
	These issues are potentially troublesome since the genesis of such judgments about sensible commercial behaviour is unclear, and it appears unfortunate that judges are expected to make assessments of commercial reasonableness without reference to wider contextual factors that might make their assessments more defensible and robust.​[48]​ This raises the suspicion that judicial use of  reasonableness or purposive criteria  allows courts to escape from enforcing an unfavourable bargain by providing a commonsense interpretation.​[49]​ Contextual interpretation provides a covert opportunity to take into consideration the limitations operating on particular kinds of contractor. Employees and local authorities, for example, may be regarded as deserving of judicial protection, as may commercial contractors who enter into agreements without any legal advice. Similarly, the manner in which contracting is conducted in particular industries (shipping, international trade, capital markets) may dictate a much less interventionist approach in line with the expectations of participants in the particular trade. It remains unclear  whether all contextual factors should be subsumed under an assessment of ‘commercial reasonableness’ and whether the conclusions reached by a court based upon such assessments should be presented as the results of interpreting the agreement. It is arguable that when these commercial considerations come into play, as Stanley Fish observed, the attempt to interpret the individual agreement has finished and something else has taken over.​[50]​
	The selection of relevant contextual factors that impinge on this assessment of commercial reasonableness may have a determinative effect on the dispute. Two recent decisions involving local authorities provide examples. In Multi-link Leisure Developments Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council​[51]​, the defendant local authority granted to a commercial developer a lease and purchase option over land on the assumption, reflected in the express terms, that it would be developed into a golf course. After some years, the residential development potential of the land became clear. The developer argued that the option purchase price should reflect the land’s value with the original development plan in mind, not the enhanced value it had as a residential development. The Supreme Court held that the parties had made the agreement on the basis that the option price would reflect the full market value of the land with all its development potential, since this was a commercial venture and that is what reasonable commercial parties would have intended. Two further considerations outlying the contract text were that the local authority was under a statutory duty to get the best price it could for public lands,​[52]​ and given the contract’s silence on the matter, the default was that one would not expect a commercial contract to allow one party to secure an uncovenanted windfall unless expressly stated.​[53]​ Similar considerations appeared in Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd,​[54]​ another case involving a local authority. Here the Supreme Court held that profit-sharing provisions based on a percentage of ‘gross sale proceeds’ in a land deal between the council and the company should be based on the open market value of the land, notwithstanding that the company had sold the land to an associate company at considerably less than market value. The contract did not state expressly that ‘gross sale proceeds’ assumed a sale at arm’s length, but the Supreme Court held that this was what the contract meant.​[55]​ The case has been criticized for allowing a feckless contractor to be rescued from the consequences of their own folly through a spurious reference to commercial sense,​[56]​ allowing the council to get the benefit of a deal they did not make.​[57]​ For Lord Hope, however, the judgment was not the result of an application of an unruly principle of commercial good sense nor a belief that the parties would have intended such a result as reasonable people negotiating in good faith, although undoubtedly these considerations played some role, but was based on the ‘words of the contract itself’.​[58]​  In effect, ‘gross sale proceeds’ was interpreted in context to mean ‘a fair market price’. In reaching his decision, Lord Hope failed to refer to precise elements of context that were relevant to his interpretation. In the end, the most compelling matter of ‘context’ appeared not to be a matter of context at all, but a judgment of the inherent unlikelihood of any reasonable council agreeing to the company’s interpretation had they been asked at the time of the contract. If anything, this result appears more in keeping with the application of the officious bystander test in implied terms, rather than of contextual interpretation.  
	References to commercial reasonableness, absurdity of outcome, and so on, seem to leave some important matters of context underexplored. That both these cases involved a local authority is not fully examined as a significant element of context justifying the decisions reached. The status of a council as a party to a commercial contract appears  as a shadowy background influence, bringing to bear a range of wider considerations that, while clearly material, are not fully articulated. These considerations may carry less influence in market environments that appear to judges to be more commercially competitive. Barnes, for example, draws attention to the very different context operating in relation to the right to withdraw ships for late hire payments in charter-party contracts, which is treated as more or less an absolute right unlimited in its exercise by any considerations of equity and reasonableness, and irrespective of the acquiescent practices that might have developed between the parties.​[59]​ An important consideration here must be the general awareness of how things in particular markets are done, an awareness which must be assumed to be shared by all the participants and hence not unexpected by any of them. The position in charter-markets, characterized by repeat and long-term trading relationships, contrasts sharply with the position of a local authority entering into a relatively isolated but high-value contract with a developer where no such internally generated norms of acceptable behaviour are available. The contextual differences between these two contracting situations may fully justify the different approaches and end results, but not the means (interpretation of contract terms) by which this differentiation is achieved.  
	Judgments of commercial reasonableness may be underpinned by a set of assumptions concerning the characteristics of commercial contractors and the deals that they make. These assumptions include matters such as the necessity for clear words if a seemingly absurd result is allowed to stand. Similarly, ‘windfalls’ to a party caused by the occurrence of some contingency on which the contract is silent may not be permitted due to a judicial belief of the inherent unlikelihood of commercial parties agreeing to such an outcome. Judges may also make assumptions concerning the commercial prudence that commercial contractors are expected to display, such as the belief that, ‘[a contract party] asked to assume a large and unpredictable risk will require some premium in exchange’.​[60]​ The law also expects that large, sophisticated commercial concerns will have reliable written records of contracts and internal management policies,​[61]​ that they will write relatively complete documents that deal with the main contingencies of performance,​[62]​ and that they will not act against their own commercial interests. The commercial contractor views breach  as an ‘incident of commercial life’​[63]​ for which they can take care of themselves, and, as such, require less protection from the law than consumers.​[64]​ Whether or not these statements are descriptively accurate they have been elevated to the status of the distinct virtues of the commercial contractor as far as the law is concerned. Despite the use of commercial reasonableness in judicial decision-making, it is difficult to see why the application of this standard should be presented as an interpretation of the text. 




By way of conclusion, some tentative suggestions are made here concerning why English law might favour a more expansive role for the operation of contract interpretation over the application of more directly interventionist forms of legal process or technique. One influential factor may be that, having been liberated from the responsibility for policing consumer contracts and other contracts carrying stark potential for abuse, the sphere of operation of the common law of contract in England has returned to the commercial agreement. Commercial contracts are undoubtedly the arena where the English common law of contract feels it has a level of fit and where the weight it attaches to the value of freedom of contract is more than merely rhetorical. In a commercial agreement the scope for a court to substitute its own view of reasonableness, or for imposing outcomes on external ‘rule of law’ grounds, should be limited. On the surface at least, an interpretative approach directed towards understanding the contract text allows the courts to keep faith with this commitment. 
	Similarly, the preference to present outcomes as derived from an interpretative process perhaps reflects the marked reluctance to let general equitable considerations play any significant role in commercial contract law. Equity’s emphasis on good conscience as a standard sits uneasily with the self-interested economic rationality that is thought to characterize the model of the commercial contractor underlying classical contract law.​[65]​ The starting point for analysis in contract law is that a commercial agreement means what it says and equity should not assist in overturning an agreed transaction even in the face of what appears to be minor or otherwise excusable infractions of the contract terms.​[66]​ As far as the law is concerned, the basis of the contractual relationship is not fiduciary but bargain.​[67]​ A corollary to this is that there are certain business relationships that can be regarded ‘exclusively commercial’​[68]​ and with this comes the understanding that only the attenuated obligations stipulated by the contract and contract law are owed between the parties. This attitude reflects the impersonal and abstract nature of the express terms that, for the law, constitute the basis upon which business proceeds. It may be that this emphasis on contract interpretation, at the expense of the imposition of doctrine or open engagement with issues of fairness, is connected to the re-emergence of formalism in contract law. Although formalism supports textual interpretation methods, the importance it places on the contract text, as the source of obligations, is one of its hallmarks.​[69]​ The meaning or interpretation of that text may be difficult without resort to some contextual factors. Given that contract law entertains the possibility that ‘arm’s-length’ trades exist, it is easy to regard the policing of obligations according to notions of good faith, or equitable considerations, as antithetical to the avowed commitments of commercial contract law. Much better then to pursue such results through an interpretative method that can subtly (or not so subtly) achieve the requisite differentiation between contracting situations without appearing to cause any serious rupture to these commitments that use of more direct interventionist principles would be unable to hide.  
	 A final consideration relating to the question of ‘why interpretation?’ is that these are problems that genuinely require acts of interpretation. It may be that such instances are presented as examples of contextual interpretation precisely to signal that different interpretative possibilities are available and to allow for some creativity (or interference) in deciding on the terms of the bargain, or indeed whether the agreed terms are fair and should be upheld. Contract law rules and doctrines, like a literal interpretative method, lack sufficient nuance in dealing with different contractual situations. A rational interpretative process accepts that there is a wide range of factors that have to be considered in resolving contract problems. One advantage of contextual interpretation is that it has the potential to recognize, and accord significance to, the fact that commercial contracting takes place against a normatively rich background (long negotiating periods, industry norms and customs, previous dealings), which provides potentially relevant evidence of the parties’ intentions and gives deeper layers of meaning to their agreement. How much of this normatively rich background is accessible and relevant to the legal determination of the dispute, and whether courts can, do and should take it into account are matters of debate. But given that commercial contractors are not a homogenous group, courts may feel less confident in regulating commercial contracts according to an autonomous set of legal rules in favour of an interpretative approach which seeks to determine intended meaning within the framework of the agreement. An interpretative response to contract problems recognizes and incorporates the understanding that contracts are socially-embedded projects which are assumed to have purposes, intended outcomes and so on, taking place against a shared set of understandings and expectations – they are not just legal phenomena comprised of words, documents or texts. 
	This wider view of interpretation has explanatory power in a decision such as Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd​[70]​ where it was decided that, given the nature of the contracting parties and their deal, the contract had incorporated an implied term of good faith. Courts can use the flexibility of contextual interpretation to mediate the parties’ obligations according to the standards and expectations that inform their specific contracting situation. While there might be an unwillingness to countenance a role for equitable considerations in commercial law, much the same effect can be achieved by a broad form of contextualism that moves beyond the contract text in sourcing the parties’ obligations. English law has not yet fully embraced this broader understanding of contextual contract interpretation, although it would appear to be the next step in the natural development of the method in the common law. The commitment to resolving contract problems through processes of interpretation also reflects judicial acceptance that reasonable persons are likely to disagree about the range of permissible conclusions that can be reached through interpretation. In its wider sense, ‘to interpret’ means to deal in a reflective and thoughtful way with ambiguity, doubt and uncertainty, formulating a reasoned answer, in accordance with the stipulated interpretation test, while accepting that there is probably no demonstrable right answer. This particular motivation for the ascendancy of contextual interpretation is likely to provide scant comfort to commercial contract lawyers.
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